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Abstract
Empirical studies have shown that preferences for redistribution are sig-
nificantly correlated with expectations of future mobility and the belief that
society offers equal opportunities. We add to previous research by inves-
tigating the role of individual and social norms on rent seeking. We find
that the individual propensity for stigmatizing rent seeking significantly and
positively affects preferences for redistribution. On the other hand, living
in an area where most citizens do not stigmatize rent seeking, makes men
more favourable to redistribution, which may be seen as a social equalizer in
an unfair society that does not offer equal opportunities to all. This effect
does not hold for women, whose preference for redistribution is negatively
associated to the regional tolerance of rent seeking.
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1 Introduction
In these times of economic crisis and public finance distress, the issue of
welfare state legitimacy has become a central theme in the political and
economic debate. Low economic growth, rising unemployment rates, and
the diffusion of income insecurity have produced contradictory pressures on
European welfare states. On the one hand, the financial viability of public
social protection schemes has been increasingly questioned. On the other
hand, the demand for social protection has dramatically risen. In Southern
Europe, conflicting views on social solidarity and public finance adjustment
have gained growing attention in electoral campaigns.
The sustainability and legitimacy of the welfare state ultimately depend
on citizens’ preferences for redistribution, which, according to standard eco-
nomic reasoning, might be basically determined by self-interest. Previous
studies have extensively analyzed self-interested reasons to support redistri-
bution in theoretical and empirical models, focusing on the effect of income
inequality, future income and mobility prospects, the perceived equality of
opportunities, and feelings of social rivalry (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981;
Piketty, 1995; Be´nabou and Ok, 2001; Fong, 2001; Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002).
The role of social norms and social interactions has so far been neglected
by the literature, with a few remarkable exceptions. Bergh and Bjørnskov
(2011, 2014) and Bjørnskov and Svendsen (2013) found a significant cross-
country correlation between historical levels of trust – measured as the be-
lief that most people can be trusted – and the current size of the welfare
state. This result suggests that some linkage might also exist between sup-
port for re-distributive policies, social norms and participation at the indi-
vidual level. The belief that others can be trusted (generally referred to
as “social trust”) also depends on the frequency, friendliness and coopera-
tiveness of interactions (Degli Antoni, 2006; Becchetti et al., 2008; Sabatini
and Sarracino, 2014). Trusting taxpayers may be less concerned about the
free riding problems intrinsically connected with universal and simple ac-
cess to public goods and services (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011). In addition,
they also may be more confident in the efficiency and honesty of bureau-
crats (Rothstein, 2002; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005). As a result, support
for re-distributive policies may more easily emerge in electoral competitions
(Yamamura, 2014). On the other hand, friendly and cooperative social in-
teractions generate feelings of empathy and solidarity thereby strengthening
other-regarding preferences (Degli Antoni, 2006). Luttmer (2001), Moffitt
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et al. (1998), and Moffitt (1999) have modeled altruism as a major driver of
preferences for redistribution. For example, the wealthiest may become in-
creasingly empathetic towards redistribution as their interaction with others
in lower socio-economic conditions increases. Poorer people who frequently
interact with the well-off may advocate redistribution through the tax sys-
tem instead of developing feelings of envy or, worse, criminal behaviors such
as theft or vandalism aimed at reducing rich people’s wealth. The hypoth-
esis of a correlation between indicators of social interactions and individual
attitudes towards redistribution has been empirically tested by Yamamura
(2012), who found that, in Japan, people are more inclined to prefer income
redistribution in areas where residents are more actively involved in com-
munity activities. Due to lack of data, however, this study neither tested
the effect of individual beliefs and sociability, nor controlled for endogeneity
bias. In one of the papers most closely related to ours, (Algan et al., 2014)
theoretically analyzed and empirically tested the roles of trust and civicness
at the individual level. Based on European Social Survey (ESS) data they
found that there is a strong positive relation between perceived civicness of
compatriots and the demand for redistribution. Algan and colleagues also
used data from the World Values Survey (WVS) to provide an empirical test
of their theoretical prediction that more civic individuals want less redistri-
bution, because they are aware of the linkage between government spending
and taxation, and they are less inclined toward cheating on taxes.
We add to the literature by empirically analyzing how individual prefer-
ences for redistribution are influenced by individual and social norms about
rent seeking. Norms are intended here as beliefs about the right way to
behave in a given context. In order to contain the bias generally induced
in estimates by omitted variables in cross-country regressions, we focus on
a notable case study, which has a particular interest for the study of re-
distributive issues.
Individual views about social issues and government actions like, for ex-
ample, civil rights and conflicts resolution, are naturally influenced by sub-
jective and societal rules of conduct. This argument may be easily extended
to citizens’ beliefs about re-distributive policies. Attitudes on rent seeking in
particular may be relevant in determining perceptions and preferences about
the tax system. Attitudes towards redistribution are a crucial issue in politi-
cal economy, as they bias electoral competitions, contribute determining the
size of government spending, and affect how taxpayers react to re-distributive
policies.
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To analyze the role of norms, we use data from the 2004 wave of the
Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank
of Italy on a nationally and regionally representative sample of the Italian
population. We differ from previous literature in three main ways. Together
with Algan et al. (2014), we are the first to investigate the role of specific
norms of conduct, after controlling for several phenomena addressed by pre-
vious studies. Differently from Yamamura (2012) and Algan et al. (2014),
we employ an instrumental variable specification of our empirical model to
establish causality. To obtain an appropriate instrument at the community
level, we match the SHIW dataset with historical data on crime provided by
the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat). This type of study has
never been conducted in Italy, which represents a valuable case study due to
rising inequalities, the strong re-distributive features of the tax system and
huge regional disparities.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next sections briefly de-
scribe the Italian background and review the literature on preferences for
redistribution. Section 2 describes our data and methods. In Sections 3 we
present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis. The concluding
section summarizes some lessons about the determinants of preferences for
redistribution and briefly discusses the implications of our study for future
research.
1.1 Inequalities and redistribution in Italy
Several reasons make Italy a relevant case study for the analysis of preferences
for redistribution. Income inequality and poverty grew rapidly, from already
comparatively high levels, during the 1990s. Despite a slight fall in the late
2000s, Italy’s inequality level is now steadily above the OECD average. The
average income of the top 10% of Italians in 2008 was 10 times higher than
that of the bottom 10%. This is up from a ratio of 8 to 1 in the mid 1980s.
Wealth is distributed much more unequally than income: the top 10% hold
some 42% of total net worth (OECD, 2008). In addition, the country has a
long tradition of extremely low social and inter-generational mobility Felice
(2012, 2013); Berloffa and Modena (2012).
Italian governments have partly offset the growing gap between rich and
poor by increasing household taxation and spending more on social bene-
fits. Income taxes and cash benefits play a large role in redistributing in-
come, reducing inequality by close to 30% (OECD, 2011). Publicly provided
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health, education and social housing, on the other hand, reduce overall in-
come inequality more than in most other OECD countries. The strongly
re-distributive features of the tax system have contributed keeping fiscal pres-
sure at a steadily high level, which have been claimed to be responsible for
feelings of aversion towards redistribution and persistently higher tax evasion
in the political debate.
Italian inequalities can also be viewed as a result of huge regional dis-
parities. The poorer Southern regions in fact exhibit the higher levels of
inequality (Brandolini, 1999). The North-South divide, however, also con-
cerns crime rates (Felice, 2007), civic participation (Putnam et al., 1993),
the individuals’ willingness to contribute to the common good (Bigoni et al.,
2013), the quality of political institutions (Putnam et al., 2003), the quality of
public services (Sabatini, 2008) and, most importantly, the local experience
of independence across history (Felice, 2013)1. The features briefly summa-
rized above make Italy a suitable laboratory for empirically analyzing what
causes support for re-distributive policies and the welfare state. However,
this issue has never been analyzed in an Italian sample.
1.2 The demand for redistribution
The archetypal presumption in economics is that preferences for redistribu-
tion are basically determined by self-interest. The most obvious explana-
tory variable that might be empirically investigated to test this assumption
is current income. A number of studies have documented that right wing
views, which are generally associated with aversion towards redistribution,
are positively correlated with high income (Brooks and Brady, 1999; Gel-
man et al., 2007; Powdthavee and Oswald, 2014). From a theoretical point
of view, Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggested in a seminal paper that, in
democracies, high inequality should lead the politically powerful, i.e. voters
at the median of the income distribution, to vote for higher levels of taxes
and redistribution, which would partially offset rising inequality.
Self-interested preferences about redistribution, however, are also based
on perceptions on social mobility and beliefs about the determinants of in-
come and wealth. In his attempt to explain the fact that voters with identical
incomes but different social origins vote differently, Piketty (1995) showed
1See for example Guiso et al. (2003), about how the medieval experience of indepen-
dence affected provinces’ current social capital levels.
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through a learning model how individual mobility experience influences atti-
tudes towards re-distributive politics. People believing that wealth depends
on luck (e.g. family background), or on having the right connections in the
right places, may be more favorable to redistribution. Those who believe
that socio-economic status solely depends on talent and effort may be more
reluctant to support redistribution. Piketty suggested that the difference be-
tween voters may not be their differing interests but rather the information
and ideas about policies that they have been exposed during their social life.
Be´nabou and Ok (2001) also modelled the role of the “prospect of upward
mobility”, suggesting that individuals with income below the mean may op-
pose re-distributive policies because they rationally expect to be above the
mean in the future.
The hypotheses about social mobility and personal beliefs have been
tested in a number of empirical works. Fong (2001) used a 1998 Gallup
survey on fairness and opportunity in the U.S. to analyse the role of beliefs
about self- and exogenous-determination in reported re-distributive policy
preferences. Her results show that the possibility to get individual gains
is not a significant predictor, even in high and low-income subsamples. In
contrast, beliefs about self- and exogenous-determination are strong predic-
tors of support for redistribution in the full, high-income, and low-income
samples.
Using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005) found that support for redistribution not only depends on expected
gain and losses from future redistribution, but also on individual beliefs on
what determines one’s position in the social ladder. Ceteris paribus, people
who believe that the American society offers equal opportunities are more
averse to redistribution.
Other motivations, such as other-regarding preferences can help explain
support for redistribution. Fong (2001) suggested that norms of reciprocity
may also lead taxpayers to prefer redistribution: “Wealthy people may desire
a society in which members who are well-off support those in need, provided
that others would do the same for them if necessary.” (p. 226).
Analysing a large international survey, Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002) found
that citizens’ support for the re-distributive role of government is strongly
influenced by their vision of what constitutes a good policy for society as
a whole. Dahlberg et al. (2012) argued that altruism might be a major
determinant of support for redistribution. However, it suffers from in-group
bias; that is, people have a tendency to favour their own kind and are more
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altruistic toward others in their own group. Drawing on Swedish longitudinal
data, the authors found that any increase in immigration has a significant,
negative effect on support for redistribution.
The role of culture has also been recently investigated. Analyzing data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln
(2007) found that, after the German reunification, East Germans are more
in favour of redistribution than West Germans, even after controlling for eco-
nomic incentives. This result received further support in Luttmer and Singhal
(2011), who analyzed the preferences for redistribution of immigrants across
32 countries using European Social Survey data. The authors showed that
inherited culture plays a crucial role: the average preference for redistribution
in an immigrant’s country of birth is a strong predictor of her own preference
for redistribution.
Despite the recent attention for other-regarding preferences in economics,
the role of social norms has been so far quite neglected in empirical studies on
support for redistribution, with a few remarkable exceptions. Three recent
studies have shown that government spending for public social protection
can be explained by the cross-country heterogeneity in trustworthiness that
shapes the demand for redistribution. Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) argued
that the more the belief that most others can be trusted is spread among
taxpayers, the higher is support for a large, universal welfare state. The
authors used a variety of data sources to analyse the role of social trust in
a sample of 77 countries. Based on instrumental variables estimates, they
found that social trust is clearly associated with the size and scope of welfare
state spending. This relationship might be due to the higher trustworthiness
of bureaucrats and to lower levels of free riding, which prevent the increases
in welfare costs that may be caused by tax evasion and rent seeking. This
result is also supported in Bjørnskov and Svendsen (2013) through more
sophisticated econometric techniques. However, countries with low trust and
where governments are perceived as corrupt (e.g. Italy) can have welfare
states as large as countries with high trust and high transparency of the
government (e.g. Sweden).
Algan et al. (2014) showed the existence of a non-monotonous relationship
between trust and various measures of the scope of the welfare states in
OECD countries, such as its size and generosity, based on WVS and OECD
Social Expenditure data. The authors explained this relationship through a
theoretical model, which predicts that citizens want more welfare expenditure
when they perceive to be surrounded by trustworthy individuals, because,
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as argued by Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011), there are reduced risks of fraud
on taxes and benefits and officials are more efficient. However, individuals
with weak civic values want more redistribution, because they plan (or at
least they hope) to escape from taxes and to benefit from public transfers
at the same time. As a consequence, the diffusion of values of civicness
and cooperative attitudes may have two opposite effects on the demand for
redistribution.
Social trust is often considered as a “cognitive” dimension of the broader
concept of social capital, in opposition to its “structural” dimensions given
by social networks and participation2. There are several reasons to argue
that social interactions, i.e. the “structural” component of social capital,
may also influence individuals’ support for redistribution. First, friendly and
cooperative interactions generate feelings of empathy and solidarity, which
may stimulate other-regarding preferences for redistribution. Second, when
the social environment is rich of participation opportunities, the likelihood to
repeat interactions between any pair of agents in society increases, thereby
increasing the cost of free riding and the importance of reputation. In a
socially rich environment, the behavior of most others is then more easily
foreseeable, and this may lead individuals to believe that most others can be
trusted (Sabatini, 2008; Antoci et al., 2012, 2013). Third, social participation
creates room for self-interested support for redistribution that are not directly
related to economic incentives. Interpersonal interactions expose to social
comparisons, which may be particularly hurtful for the poor. As sustained
by Luttmer (2001), “The negative effect of a neighbor’s earnings on well-being
is real and it is most likely caused by a psychological externality” (p. 990).
The frequency of contacts with neighbouring people reinforces this effect
(Stutzer, 2004). In addition, the wealthy may want a more re-distributive
tax system in order not to become the object of feelings of envy and hate
by their poorer fellow citizens. As suggested by Fong (2001) and Yamamura
2Following Uphoff (1999), it is possible to distinguish between structural and cognitive
dimensions of the concept. Structural social capital deals with individuals’ behaviours and
mainly takes the form of networks and associations, which can be observed and measured,
through surveys. Cognitive social capital derives from individuals’ perceptions resulting
in norms, values and beliefs that contribute to cooperation. These latter aspects involve
subjective evaluations of the social environment. Both structural and cognitive dimensions
include several sub-dimensions whose relationship with health variables in turn varies de-
pending on the context and on the effect of other individual and local potentially influential
factors (Degli Antoni and Sacconi, 2011; Yamamura, 2011).
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(2012), redistribution may also be seen as a way to prevent criminal acts of
theft and vandalism to the detriment of the wealthiest.
Yamamura (2012) used Japanese survey data to empirically test the role
of social participation in individuals’ preferences for redistribution. He found
that people are more likely to prefer income redistribution in areas where
there are higher rates of community participation. The effect is stronger
for individuals with a higher propensity for socialization. These findings,
however, require further investigation to be generalized, as Japan is a very
specific case study due to its cultural background and tradition of racially
homogeneous society. In the conclusion to this study, the author stressed the
need to test his findings in a Western country and to control for endogeneity
bias.
In this paper we take over from Yamamura (2012) and test his hypotheses
on Italy. After controlling for the role of community social interactions, we
follow Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) and Algan et al. (2014) and move our
focus to norms of conducts, with a special attention to the role of individual
and social attitudes toward rent seeking.
1.2.1 Main hypotheses
A social norm can be defined as a rule of conduct shared by a group, a
community, or a society. It can be sustained both by sanctions and by emo-
tions of guilt and shame, which lead its followers to forego selfish benefits in
the name of the group’s welfare. We argue that social norms may have an
important influence on agents’ preferences, especially when it comes to their
opinions and behaviors related to the tax system. If the prevalent social norm
imposes a stigma on rent seekers, then the individual is likely to perceive the
majority of her fellow citizens as honest and trustworthy. Utility maximizing
taxpayers may want to support redistribution even when they are unlikely
to benefit from it for at least three reasons (in addition to other-regarding
concerns for fairness and solidarity): there are reduced risks of free riding,
redistribution may support efficient forms of social insurance, and it lowers
the exposure to negative feelings and criminal behaviors by the poor.
Hypothesis 1: social norm imposing a stigma on rent seekers increases in-
dividuals’ preference for redistribution.
Individual norms are private beliefs about what should be done in certain
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situations. They may be inherited from the family, or shaped by everyday
experience about the others’ behaviors and beliefs. Non-rent seekers may
advocate for redistribution due to reciprocity concerns, and may feel more
confident in the fairness and honesty of their fellow citizens and of bureau-
crats. They may also have altruistic concerns and a preference for income
equality.
Hypothesis 2: individual norm stigmatizing rent seeking raises individuals’
preference for redistribution.
2 Data and methods
To analyze the effect of individual and social norms on preferences for redis-
tribution, we used a section of data drawn from the 2004 wave of the SHIW,
which is conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy3. The sample in-
cludes about 8,000 households and it is representative of the Italian popula-
tion at the national and region level (Bank of Italy, 2010). The sample was
drawn in two stages (municipalities and households), with the stratification
of the primary sampling units (municipalities) by region and demographic
size. Within each stratum, the municipalities in which interviews would be
conducted were selected to include all those with a population of more than
40,000 inhabitants (self-representing municipalities), while the smaller towns
were selected on the basis of probability proportional to size (Bank of Italy,
2004). The individual households to be interviewed were then selected ran-
domly. In the 2004 wave of the survey, a special section on public spirit and
taxation was included in the questionnaire, in which respondents were asked
to give their opinions on the tax system.
We followed Yamamura (2012) and used as dependent variable in the
empirical analysis the 5 points-score given by respondents to the following
statement: “The more someone earns, the more (in percentage) he/she should
contribute to Government spending”, with 1 meaning “not at all” and 5
meaning “very much”.
To assess the individual attitudes toward rent seeking, we use the 10
points-score used by respondents to assess whether “Keeping money you ob-
tained by accident when it would be possible to return it to the rightful owner
3SHIW data can be downloaded from the Bank of Italy’s website at the url:
http://bit.ly/shiw2004
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(for example, if you found a wallet with the owner’s name and address, or
if you were given too much change at the supermarket check-out)” is justi-
fiable or not. With 1 meaning “Never justifiable” and 10 meaning “Always
justifiable”. We also computed and included in regressions the average value
of the scores at the region level, in order to measure the trustworthiness of
the people with whom respondents are more likely to interact.
Following seminal studies in the field (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997; Guiso
et al., 2003), we believe that these items well capture individuals’ attitudes
toward rent seeking and free riding. Opinions about the justifiability of
keeping an accidentally retrieved wallet are a particularly reliable indicator of
the propensity for free riding, as this scenario only deals with moral concerns
and it can hardly be influenced by respondents’ risk aversion because there
is no chance of being caught in the act.
The relationship between preferences for redistribution and individual
and social norms (ind normsi and soc normsi respectively) about rent seek-
ing was investigated through an ordered probit model with robust standard
errors reporting marginal effects. If the dependent variable is ordered in K
categories, then the model for social interactions is:
Yi =


1 if yi ≤ 0,
2 if 0 < yi ≤ c1,
3 if c1 < yi ≤ c2,
...
K if cK−1 < yi.
(1)
where 0 < c1 < c2 < . . . < cK−1; Yi = α+β1 · ind normsi+β2 · soc normsi+
θ ·Xi+ ǫi, ǫi ∼ N(0, 1); the index i stands for individuals; cK−1 are unknown
parameters to be estimated, and θ is a vector of parameters for the vector
of control variables Xi.
Vector Xi includes:
• A measure of income inequality, which was identified by previous litera-
ture as a major responsible of individuals’ preference for redistribution
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Our indicator is the Gini index computed
at the region level using SHIW data for 2004;
• Regions’ per capita income, population, and unemployment rate in
2003 provided by the Istat (Istat, 2005);
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• An indicator of regional social capital given by the number of people
who did unpaid work for volunteering associations in 2003 for every
100 people living in the same area (Istat, 2005);
• An indicator of regional religious participation, given by the percentage
of the population who went to a place of worship in 2003 (Istat, 2005);
• The total income earned by respondents in 2004, obtained as the sum
of: 1) the product between the average monthly net earnings (includ-
ing overtime) and the number of months worked; 2) Any additional
monthly salary (e.g. 13th month salary or Christmas bonus, 14th
month salary, etc.); 3) Bonuses or special payments; 4) Other com-
pensations (e.g. productivity bonuses, commissions, etc.);
• Age, sex, civil status, and education (four categories);
• Indicators of the regional share of households adopting precaution mea-
sures to protect their homes against theft and vandalism (Istat, 2004).
These measures include the habit of leaving the light on when away
from home (labelled as “lights on” in the tables), the habit of asking
neighbors to look after one’s homes when away (“neighbors”), the adop-
tion of a watch dog to guard against unwanted or unexpected people
(“dogs”), the purchase of a home safety system connected with a private
vigilance service (“security”), the ownership of weapons for personal
defence (“weapons”), the subscription of an insurance against theft
(“insurance”), and the installation of a burglar alarm system (“burglar
alarm”). A summary of descriptive statistics is reported in Table 1.
The coefficients from equation 1 indicate the sign and magnitude of partial
correlations among variables. However, attitudes toward rent seeking might
be endogenous to preferences for redistribution. Individual effects such as
personal characteristics or exogenous shocks may in fact be correlated with
both individual norms about rent seeking and support for redistribution.
People who support redistribution may be motivated by other-regarding
preferences that can also stimulate concerns for fairness and reciprocity and
a stigma on rent seeking and free riding behaviors. On the other hand,
particularly selfish individuals who do not care about inequalities may also
be less sensitive to fairness and reciprocity, and may want to take advantage
of any possibility of free riding that happens by chance, such as the retrieval
of a lost wallet.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
variable mean sd min max obs
preference for redistribution 2.553 0.699 1 3 3798
keeping money you are not entitled to 8.754 2.012 1 10 3798
keeping money you are not entitled to (regional average) 0.087 0.001 0.083 0.091 3798
regional gini index 0.257 0.020 0.221 0.310 3798
regional income (log) 10.09 0.233 9.647 10.38 3798
regional population (log) 14.95 0.744 11.71 16.04 3798
volunteering (regional average) 0.092 0.034 0.038 0.210 3798
religious participation (regional average) 0.334 0.078 0.203 0.453 3798
total earned income 1.471 0.778 0.025 10 3798
age 46.09 21.71 0 99 3798
gender 0.507 0.500 0 1 3798
high-school 0.260 0.439 0 1 3798
associate’s degree 0.007 0.085 0 1 3798
university 0.074 0.263 0 1 3798
post-university 0.001 0.039 0 1 3798
married 0.537 0.499 0 1 3798
divorced 0.025 0.157 0 1 3798
unemployed 0.016 0.127 0 1 3798
lights on 0.222 0.042 0.171 0.318 3798
neighbours 0.395 0.021 0.343 0.433 3798
dogs 0.126 0.026 0.072 0.179 3798
security 0.039 0.008 0.025 0.066 3798
weapons 0.128 0.042 0.086 0.255 3798
theft insurance 0.165 0.077 0.041 0.277 3798
burglar alarm 0.147 0.038 0.0780 0.202 3798
% of people reported for crime 0.843 0.384 0.300 2.200 3798
To deal with these problems, we employed instrumental variables esti-
mates using a two stage least squares (2SLS) model (Wooldridge, 2002)
where, in the first stage, we instrumented our measures of the individual
norms about rent seeking.
A reliable instrumental variable must meet at least two criteria. First,
it must be theoretically justified and statistically correlated with the norms
about rent seeking (“relevance” condition), after controlling for all other
exogenous regressors. Second, it must be uncorrelated with the disturbance
term of the equation determining individual preferences for redistribution
(“orthogonality” condition).
We identified two econometrically convenient instruments in the crime
rates registered in respondents’ area of residence. More specifically, we in-
strument the individual stigma towards rent seeking with the rate of reported
crimes for which a judicial procedure was started by the authorities, and with
the rate of juvenile offenders who were reported for crimes for which a judicial
procedure was started by the authorities in respondents’ area of residence.
Criminality may affect stigma towards rent seeking in a number of ways.
People who live in an area were criminality is widely spread may consider
keeping money obtained by accident (e.g. by retrieving a wallet on the floor)
as a venial sin. On the other hand, the diffusion of criminality generally
nurtures feelings of mistrust towards unknown others. So people may rea-
sonably expect that the restitution of money obtained by accident would
hardly be reciprocated, thus making the action of keeping it less despicable.
In addition, higher crime rates also raise the likelihood that unknown others
are delinquents, further reducing the incentive to return the money.
As for the orthogonality condition, it is reasonable to expect that, in areas
with higher crime rates, citizens advocate for a stronger effort of public insti-
tutions to fight criminality, which would question the validity of instruments.
Public actions against crime, in fact, may require more public expenditure
and eventually more redistribution. However, in the empirical analysis we
controlled for a number of respondents’ actions to protect themselves against
criminality, which capture citizens’ demand for safety – and the associated
demand for redistribution – in a fairly precise way.
The inclusion of the individual demand for safety in the analysis allows
us to reasonably assume that any possible influence of criminality on respon-
dents’ demand for redistribution cannot be related to the need of protection
and should eventually be attributed to the effect of crime on the social norms
and beliefs shared by individuals, i.e. our endogenous variable.
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3 Results
We first report, in Table 2, how the covariates correlate with the dependent
variable. Preferences for redistribution are significantly and positively asso-
ciated with respondents’ tolerance of rent seeking, as measured by the degree
to which keeping money that was obtained by accident is considered justifi-
able. This result is highly statistically significant for the whole sample (t =
8.83) and for both the subsamples of men (t = 8.51) and women (t = 4.12).
For women, preference for redistribution shows a significant and negative
association with the intensity of regional stigma towards rent seeking. This
variable, however, is not statistically significant for men and for the whole
sample.
Inconsistently with previous studies (e.g. Luttmer and Singhal, 2011),
the economic variables – i.e. income, education, and work status – are not
significantly correlated with preference for redistribution. This result may
be explained by our ability to control for a number of economic and social
characteristics of respondents’ area of residence, and, most importantly, for
the diffusion of precaution measures against micro criminality. In particu-
lar, regional social capital is significantly and negatively correlated with the
dependent variable. In the sample of men, the regional level of religious
participation also shows a significant and negative association with the de-
pendent variable. Higher regional income inequality as measured by the Gini
index, on the other hand, is associated with lower preference for redistribu-
tion. This result is statistically significant for the whole sample and for the
sample of women, but not for me, and requires further empirical investigation
for a credible interpretation.
Among precaution measures against theft and vandalism, the habit of
leaving the lights on is negatively associated with the dependent variable
(coefficients are significant for men and for the whole sample, but not for
women). Respondents living in areas where people are used to look after
their neighbours’ homes when they are away also show a significantly higher
preference for redistribution. This indicator, however, may also reflect the
regional level of social cohesion and cooperativeness, in addition to respon-
dents’ actual concern for micro criminality. The average incidence of home
alarm systems in the area of residence, on the other hand, is negatively asso-
ciated with the dependent variable for men (t = -5.69), for the whole sample
(t = -3.59), and more weakly for women (t = -1.78). Regional income and
population are not significantly correlated with the dependent variable. The
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Table 2: Norms of rent seeking and preferences for redistribution. Ordered probit estimates.
all men women
preference for redistribution
keeping money you are not entitled to 0.073∗∗∗ (8.47) 0.090∗∗∗ (8.58) 0.052∗∗∗ (3.60)
keeping money you are not entitled to (regional average) 8.470 (0.68) 49.845∗∗ (3.21) −30.541∗ (−2.54)
regional gini index −3.458∗∗ (−3.11) −1.129 (−0.88) −5.058∗∗∗ (−3.92)
regional income (log) 0.004 (0.05) 0.196∗∗ (2.70) −0.120 (−0.94)
regional population (log) 0.128∗∗ (3.05) 0.156∗∗∗ (3.70) 0.082 (1.66)
volunteering (regional average) −2.977∗∗∗ (−3.93) −2.678∗∗∗ (−3.33) −3.827∗∗∗ (−4.21)
religious participation (regional average) −0.156 (−0.71) −0.639∗∗ (−2.98) 0.410 (1.51)
total earned income 0.009 (0.34) 0.027 (0.85) −0.010 (−0.30)
age 0.000 (0.13) −0.000 (−0.23) 0.001 (0.52)
gender −0.083 (−1.54)
high-school 0.062 (0.97) 0.021 (0.22) 0.103 (1.35)
associate’s degree −0.023 (−0.10) −0.093 (−0.29) 0.072 (0.21)
university −0.113 (−1.44) −0.117 (−1.02) −0.100 (−0.95)
post-university 0.077 (0.15) 3.731∗∗∗ (26.86) −0.418 (−1.04)
married 0.015 (0.32) 0.015 (0.15) 0.017 (0.35)
divorced −0.211 (−1.30) 0.011 (0.05) −0.365∗ (−2.45)
unemployed −0.035 (−0.33) −0.114 (−0.79) 0.226 (0.71)
lights on −1.671∗∗∗ (−6.46) −2.534∗∗∗ (−8.09) −0.810∗∗ (−3.09)
neighbours 5.257∗∗∗ (5.73) 7.340∗∗∗ (6.37) 3.969∗∗∗ (4.33)
dogs −0.473 (−0.94) 1.819∗∗∗ (3.37) −3.116∗∗∗ (−3.88)
security 13.744∗∗∗ (4.34) 6.320 (1.66) 19.323∗∗∗ (5.35)
weapons −0.063 (−0.20) −2.127∗∗∗ (−7.09) 1.857∗∗∗ (3.51)
theft insurance 0.590 (1.53) −0.034 (−0.09) 1.249∗ (2.16)
burglar alarm −5.009∗∗∗ (−4.13) −6.428∗∗∗ (−5.34) −3.749∗∗ (−3.07)
cut1
Constant 2.441 (1.87) 9.087∗∗∗ (5.72) −3.200∗ (−1.97)
cut2
Constant 3.180∗ (2.43) 9.817∗∗∗ (6.16) −2.443 (−1.51)
Observations 3798 1873 1925
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.028 0.015
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share of households owning a home safety system connected with a private
vigilance service is positively related to individual preferences for redistribu-
tion for men, women, and for the whole sample. The ownership of weapons
for personal use is negatively correlated with men’s preference for redistribu-
tion.
The positive association between the individual tolerance towards rent
seeking and preference for redistribution is counter-intuitive and not ex-
pected. Algan et al. (2014) suggested that rent seekers might be more airily
favorable to redistribution as they also consider cheating on taxes as a feasi-
ble option. The estimates presented in Table 2, however, may be biased by
omitted confounding factors, as explained in Section 2. For example, in areas
historically affected by criminality and corruption, such as Italian Southern
regions, people may feel rent seeking as the only possible way to effectively
advance their interests. Redistribution entails higher levels of public expen-
diture, which in turn may create higher opportunities for rent seeking. On
the other hand, people who are less tolerant towards free riding may also
feel more concerned about public finance adjustment and thus prefer less
redistribution.
The main result of the ordered probit is challenged by the estimates
obtained by instrumenting our main explanatory variable, which allow us
to control for endogeneity bias. Coefficients are reported in Table 3 (where
z-values are reported in brackets).
Individuals’ tolerance towards rent seeking is significantly (t = -4.58) and
negatively correlated with preference for redistribution. Gender effects are
presented in tables 4 and 5. The correlation seems to be stronger for women
(t = -5.38) than for men (t = -1.84).
The regional level of tolerance is not statistically significant in the whole
sample. However, interesting gender effects emerge when splitting the sam-
ple: men who live in areas where free riding is more tolerated present a
significantly higher preference for redistribution (t = 3.42). The opposite
holds for women (t = -2.22).
Hypothesis 1 apparently holds for women but not for men. The fact
of living in an area where free riding is more tolerated, in fact, raises men’s
preference for redistribution. In a society where most people would not return
a wallet that was found by accident, individuals may perceive that most of
their fellow citizens are potential rent seekers. This perception is likely to be
associated with the belief that socio-economic status can hardly be changed
with talent and effort and that one’s position in the social ladder basically
17
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Table 3: Norms of rent seeking and preferences for redistribution: marginal
effects.
No So so Yes
keeping money you are not entitled to -0.0142∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
keeping money you are not entitled to (regional average) -1.660 -1.331 2.991
(0.500) (0.499) (0.499)
regional gini index 0.678∗∗ 0.544∗∗ -1.221∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
regional income (log) -0.000692 -0.000555 0.00125
(0.961) (0.961) (0.961)
regional population (log) -0.0251∗∗ -0.0201∗∗ 0.0452∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
volunteering (regional average) 0.583∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ -1.051∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
religious participation (regional average) 0.0306 0.0245 -0.0551
(0.477) (0.471) (0.474)
total earned income -0.00179 -0.00144 0.00323
(0.735) (0.735) (0.735)
age -0.0000166 -0.0000133 0.0000299
(0.897) (0.897) (0.897)
gender 0.0162 0.0130 -0.0292
(0.123) (0.123) (0.122)
high-school -0.0121 -0.00967 0.0217
(0.331) (0.335) (0.333)
associate’s degree 0.00454 0.00364 -0.00818
(0.919) (0.919) (0.919)
university 0.0221 0.0177 -0.0399
(0.147) (0.155) (0.150)
post-university -0.0150 -0.0121 0.0271
(0.882) (0.882) (0.882)
married -0.00299 -0.00240 0.00538
(0.747) (0.748) (0.747)
divorced 0.0414 0.0332 -0.0746
(0.190) (0.196) (0.192)
unemployed 0.00678 0.00544 -0.0122
(0.741) (0.739) (0.740)
lights on 0.327∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ -0.590∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
neighbours -1.030∗∗∗ -0.826∗∗∗ 1.857∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dogs 0.0927 0.0744 -0.167
(0.344) (0.352) (0.347)
security -2.694∗∗∗ -2.160∗∗∗ 4.854∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
weapons 0.0123 0.00986 -0.0222
(0.844) (0.844) (0.844)
theft insurance -0.116 -0.0927 0.208
(0.123) (0.130) (0.126)
burglar alarm 0.982∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ -1.769∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3798 3798 3798
depends on luck or having the right contacts in the right places. In this case,
individuals may see redistribution by the public sector as the only possible
way to reach decent standard of living in a society that does not offer equal
opportunities to all or, as suggested by Algan et al. (2014), as a source of
rent seeking opportunities.
This result may be interpreted as the legacy of a solid tradition of cor-
ruption that has been plaguing the Italian public sector at least since the
post-war period. Empirical studies on Italy suggest that a dramatic rise in
corruption took place in the period between 1970 and 1993 (Marselli and Van-
nini, 1997; Golden, 2000; Golden and Picci, 2005; Del Monte and Papagni,
2007; Felice, 2007)4.
The existence of a causal relationship between corruption and public ex-
penditure has been repeatedly argued both in the academic and in the Ital-
ian political debate (see for example Golden, 2000; Del Monte and Papagni,
2007). According to Golden (2000), the steep growth of government inter-
vention in the economy that took place in the 1970s and the 1980s created
new opportunities for corruption. On the other hand, public expenditure
also rose due to the pressure of special interest groups on corrupted politi-
cians. The interaction of these forces “produced a change toward a higher
level of equilibrium of corruption” (Golden, 2000, p. 15). At the micro level,
the vicious circle described by Golden probably exacerbated the feelings of
mistrust towards public institutions and unknown others that, according to
the literature, already were typical of the Italian society (see for example
Putnam et al., 1993; Degli Antoni, 2006; Sabatini, 2009; Felice, 2013). In
his seminal work on the moral basis of Italian backwardness, Banfield (1958)
first introduced the concept of “amoral familism” to describe Southern Ital-
ian households’ inability “to act together for their common good or, indeed,
for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear fam-
ily” Banfield (1958, p.10). According to the author, social relationships in
4According to some authors (Golden, 2000; Del Monte and Papagni, 2007), 1993 repre-
sents a turning point in the Italian trend of corruption for at least two reasons. First, the
Maastricht Treaty signed in 1991 that set strict fiscal convergence criteria, jointly with the
currency crisis that forced Italy out of the European Monetary System in 1992, forced the
government led by Giuliano Amato (1992-1993) to start new restrictive budgetary policies
to reduce public debt. Second, in 1993, judicial inquiries known as “Mani Pulite” severely
contrasted the system of political patronage. Immediately after “Mani Pulite” a reduction
in the cost of public works for government was registered (Golden, 2000; Del Monte and
Papagni, 2007).
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Table 4: Norms of rent seeking and men’ preferences for redistribution:
marginal effects.
No So so Yes
keeping money you are not entitled to -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.00823∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
keeping money you are not entitled to (regional average) 6.187∗∗ 4.822∗ -11.01∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011)
regional gini index 1.025∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ -1.823∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
regional income (log) 0.0243 0.0190 -0.0433
(0.350) (0.344) (0.347)
regional population (log) -0.0166 -0.0130 0.0296
(0.100) (0.094) (0.096)
volunteering (regional average) 0.775∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ -1.380∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
religious participation (regional average) -0.0831 -0.0648 0.148
(0.128) (0.141) (0.133)
total earned income 0.00204 0.00159 -0.00364
(0.762) (0.760) (0.761)
age -0.000141 -0.000110 0.000251
(0.597) (0.603) (0.600)
high-school -0.0209 -0.0163 0.0371
(0.182) (0.167) (0.175)
associate’s degree -0.0145 -0.0113 0.0258
(0.831) (0.830) (0.830)
university 0.0203 0.0158 -0.0361
(0.339) (0.348) (0.342)
post-university 0.0846 0.0660 -0.151
(0.299) (0.299) (0.299)
married -0.00344 -0.00268 0.00611
(0.723) (0.724) (0.723)
divorced 0.0739∗ 0.0576∗ -0.131∗
(0.012) (0.019) (0.014)
unemployed -0.0459 -0.0358 0.0816
(0.474) (0.482) (0.478)
lights on 0.164∗∗ 0.128∗∗ -0.292∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
neighbours -0.804∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ 1.431∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dogs 0.631∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
security -3.915∗∗∗ -3.051∗∗∗ 6.965∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
weapons -0.376∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
theft insurance -0.253∗ -0.197∗ 0.450∗
(0.030) (0.035) (0.031)
burglar alarm 0.760∗∗ 0.592∗∗ -1.351∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 1925 1925 1925
the Italian Mezzogiorno were rooted in distrust, envy, and suspicion, to the
point that fellow citizens generally would refuse to help each other except
where one’s own particular material gain was at stake.
In this scenario, the rise in corruption and the country’s worsening eco-
nomic situation, which resulted in the currency crisis that forced Italy out
of the European Monetary System in 1992, may help explaining the positive
correlation existing in our sample between preferences for redistribution and
the regional level of people’s trustworthiness, as a result of two main factors.
1) The desire to improve equality in opportunities, to possibly counterbal-
ance the effect of rent seeking and patronage in a society that is believed not
to offer equal opportunities to all. 2) The strengthening of amoral familism,
which leads individuals to see public expenditure as a source of rent seeking
opportunities.
This result and its interpretation are in line with previous studies on the
topic claiming that a lower confidence in self-determination is associated with
a higher preference for redistribution (Piketty, 1995; Fong, 2001; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2005), and that, in a society characterized by low civic values,
citizens may want to exploit the higher public expenditure connected with
greater redistribution for their own rent seeking purposes, as suggested in
Algan et al. (2014).
On the other hand, these effects seem not to hold for women, whose
preference for redistribution decreases with the regional tolerance for rent
seeking. This difference may be due to women’s greater concern for the
rent seeking behaviours potentially connected with higher levels of public
expenditure, which seems consistent with previous behavioral studies that
found women to be more trustworthy and public-spirited than men. For
example, as reported in Dollar et al. (2001), women have been found more
likely to help others in need (Eagly and Crowley, 1986), to vote based on
social issues (Goertzel, 1983), to score more highly on “integrity tests” (Ones
and Viswesvaran, 1998), and to take stronger stances on ethical behaviour
(Glover et al., 1997; Reiss and Mitra, 1998). Using a variety of independent
data sources, Swamy et al. (2001) presented evidence that in hypothetical
situations women are less likely to condone corruption, and that women
managers are less involved in bribery.
Hypothesis 2, on the other hand, is fully supported by the empirical ev-
idence. Individual values of honesty and respect towards unknown others
are associated with a higher preference for redistribution. Honest and re-
spectful people may, in fact, also share feelings of altruism and be more
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inclined towards reciprocity. This result is consistent with previous claims
about altruism as a major determinant of support for redistribution (Corneo
and Gru¨ner, 2002; Dahlberg et al., 2012), and does not provide support to
findings in Algan et al. (2014), according to which more civic individuals
want less redistribution, probably because they are aware of the linkage be-
tween government spending and taxation, and they are less inclined toward
cheating on taxes. The size and significance of all the other covariates are
confirmed in CMP estimates.
4 Conclusions
This paper shows that individual and social norms of tolerance of rent seek-
ing are associated with preference for redistribution in a non-trivial way.
Our findings challenge the mainstream assumption that individual attitudes
about redistribution can satisfactorily be explained by the individual pecu-
niary incentives involved. Preferences for redistribution are higher among
citizens who report to be less tolerant towards rent seeking. These honest
citizens would hardly consider exploiting redistribution to fraudulently gain
personal advantages. Rather, their opinion about re-distributive issues seems
to be linked to altruistic and moral concerns. On the other hand, living in
an area where most citizens do not stigmatize rent seeking makes men more
favorable to redistribution, that may be seen as a social equalizer in an unfair
society that does not offer equal opportunities to all. This effect, however,
does not hold for women, whose preference for redistribution is negatively
associated to regional tolerance of rent seeking.
These results suffer from some weaknesses related to the unavailability of
data. First, the cross-sectional nature of the analysis dictates caution in the
interpretation of correlations as causal linkages. Second, we were not able to
control for the local levels of social trust, which may play a role in shaping
the relationship between citizens’ attitudes towards rent seeking and their
vision of the re-distributive role of public policies. In addition, our proxies of
preference for redistribution and attitudes towards rent seeking are definitely
susceptible of improvement.
On the other hand, this study is the first to analyze how individual and
social norms about rent seeking are associated to individual preferences for
redistribution, which ultimately are the foundations of welfare state legit-
imacy. Our findings should encourage further empirical research based on
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Table 5: Norms of rent seeking and women’ preferences for redistribution:
marginal effects.
No So so Yes
keeping money you are not entitled to -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
keeping money you are not entitled to (regional average) -9.287∗∗ -7.649∗∗ 16.94∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
regional gini index 0.210 0.173 -0.384
(0.380) (0.379) (0.379)
regional income (log) -0.0366∗∗ -0.0301∗∗ 0.0667∗∗
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
regional population (log) -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0532∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
volunteering (regional average) 0.499∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗ -0.910∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
religious participation (regional average) 0.119∗∗ 0.0981∗∗ -0.217∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
total earned income -0.00497 -0.00409 0.00906
(0.402) (0.380) (0.392)
age 0.0000814 0.0000671 -0.000148
(0.818) (0.819) (0.818)
high-school -0.00400 -0.00329 0.00730
(0.827) (0.827) (0.827)
associate’s degree 0.0172 0.0142 -0.0314
(0.776) (0.774) (0.775)
university 0.0218 0.0180 -0.0398
(0.304) (0.306) (0.305)
post-university -0.695∗∗∗ -0.573∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
married -0.00288 -0.00237 0.00526
(0.883) (0.883) (0.883)
divorced -0.00213 -0.00175 0.00388
(0.960) (0.960) (0.960)
unemployed 0.0213 0.0175 -0.0388
(0.430) (0.427) (0.429)
lights on 0.472∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ -0.861∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
neighbours -1.368∗∗∗ -1.126∗∗∗ 2.494∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dogs -0.339∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
security -1.177 -0.970 2.147
(0.100) (0.097) (0.098)
weapons 0.396∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ -0.723∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
theft insurance 0.00637 0.00525 -0.0116
(0.926) (0.926) (0.926)
burglar alarm 1.198∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ -2.184∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1873 1873 1873
more comprehensive and longitudinal data.
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